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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407 AND STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-THE RULE AGAINST
SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS LIVES ON
JOHN BLAKELY Low
"Tt would be [barbarous]," Baron Bramwell wrote over one
-hundred years ago, "to hold that, because the world gets
wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before."' The
Baron was speaking specifically about the doctrine of subse-
quent repairs,' an area of the law which, until recently,3 had
been well-settled.' Evidence of remedial measures taken after
an injury-causing event to prevent a future occurrence of a
similar event has not been admissible in the past to establish
a defendant's negligence or culpable conduct." While there are
' Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (1869).
2 The doctrine of subsequent repairs is actually an exclusionary rule of evidence
which precludes the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by
a manufacturer following an accident. See FED. R. EvID. 407 and advisory committee
note. The terms "exclusionary rule", "Rule 407", and "subsequent repairs rule" used
throughout this comment refer to the doctrine of subsequent repairs.
a See Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980) (rule against subse-
quent repairs does not apply to actions based on strict liability); Farner v. Paccar,
Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of subsequent repairs admissible under
strict liability count); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788
(8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of subsequent remedial warning admissible in strict liability
cause of action); Abel v. J.C. Penney Co., 488 F. Supp. 891 (D. Minn. 1980), aff'd, 660
F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1981) (subsequent repair evidence admissible in strict liability
action).
' See infra note 7 for a list of cases refusing to admit evidence of subsequent re-
pairs in both negligence and strict liability actions.
' For general discussions of the early development of the doctrine of subsequent
repair, see C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 275, at 666 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as C. McCoRMICK] and 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 283(4), at 151 (3d
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as J. WIGMORE].
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a number of recognized exceptions to the doctrine,6 it has nev-
ertheless retained its vitality over the years in the field of neg-
ligence. In the last ten years, however, with the appearance of
strict liability,8 the doctrine of subsequent repairs has come
0 Both the general rule and exceptions to it were codified in 1975 in FED. R. EVID.
407, which provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the ex-
clusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precau-
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id.
Over the years the doctrine of subsequent repairs has had an even application;
see, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983)
(change in design of acetylene gas valve following fire, inadmisible for the reason that
such evidence has no bearing on the negligence of the manufacturer at time of acci-
dent); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (change in warning given by
drug company following accident inadmissible for reason that such evidence discour-
ages subsequent repairs and is not relevant to defendant's antecedent negligence);
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F. 2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (changes made in design of
meat grinder following accident inadmissible for reason that such evidence, if admit-
ted, would discourage manufacturers from improving the safety features of their
products); Limbeck v. Interstate Power Co., 69 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1934) (changes
made in construction following electrically-caused fire inadmissible, for reason that
such evidence not proper as showing a negligent construction before the fire.); Bing-
ham Mines Co. v. Bianco, 246 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1917) (repairs made following death
in a mine inadmissible for reason that such evidence is distinctly prejudicial and has
no legitimate tendency to prove negligence at time of accident); Southern Ry. v.
Simpson, 131 F. 705 (6th Cir. 1904) (custom of blowing whistle and ringing bell at
intersection adopted following accident inadmissible for reason that such evidence is
incompetent to show the custom of defendant before the collision); Columbia &
P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892) (subsequent placing of safeguards on ma-
chine after injury inadmissible for reason that such evidence is incompetent to prove
prior negligence at time of accident). For additional case law on this issue, see Annot.,
50 A.L.R. FED. 935 (1980).
" The basic theory of strict liability is contained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 402A (1965), which provides in relevant part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product; and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
COMMENTS
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
The decision which brought strict liability to the forefront was the 1963 case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). In Greenman the plaintiff was injured while working on a power tool that
ejected a piece of wood which struck him in the face. Believing the machine to be
defective, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer in negligence and
breach of warranty. The manufacturer defended on the ground that the plaintiff did
not give notice of the breach of warranty within a reasonable time, and therefore his
claim was barred. The court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to estab-
lish an express warranty and that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action under a
strict liability theory. Chief Justice Traynor's opinion for the court set forth the first
definition of true strict liability: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Greenman, 377
P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
After Greenman and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), the theory of
strict liability became an integral tool in a plaintiff's suit for damages. To make out a
cause of action in strict liability, a plaintiff must establish two elements. The first
element of a strict liability action is the existence of a defect. According to Chief
Justice Traynor, a defective product may be defined as "one that fails to match the
average quality of like products, and the manufacturer is then liable for injuries re-
sulting from deviations from the norm." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). In additon to
the defect, the plaintiff must show that the defect caused the injury. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965) for a brief discussion of establish-
ing the defect as the cause of injury.
The second element is that the defect existed at the time it left the manufacturer's
control. If the product is delivered by the manufacturer in a safe condition, the man-
ufacturer is not liable, although "safe condition" entails "proper packaging, necessary
sterilization, and other precautions required to permit the product to remain safe for
a normal length of time when handled in a normal manner." Id.
The parties to a strict liability suit are not confined to just the manufacturer and
purchaser. According to Professor Prosser, the plaintiffs may include not only the
purchaser, but "any user or consumer of the product" which may be defined as
"members of [the final purchaser's] family, his guest, his employees, his lessee, and
his donee." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 817 (1966). In terms of defendants, Prosser lists as proper parties
the manufacturer, the assembler of parts, the maker of component parts, and the
retail dealer, although he points out that the list is not exhaustive. Id. at 814-16.
Finally, Prosser states that all types of products can be defective and thus at issue
in a strict liability action. He notes that inherently dangerous products, such as
knives, are not normally included in the definition of unreasonably dangerous and are
therefore not within the purview of strict liability. If the product is "recognizably
dangerous to the user or to his property" and proves to be defective, that is enough.
Id. at 805. For additional discussion on strict liability, see Annot. 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057
(1967).
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under fire.9 Opponents of the doctrine argue that an action
predicated upon a strict products liability theory does not in-
quire into the negligence or culpable conduct of the defen-
dant, and that therefore, Federal Rule of Evidence 407,10 the
rule mandating exclusion of evidence of subsequent repairs,
has no applicability to strict products liability." This oppos-
ing view of Rule 407 has gained increasing acceptance, espe-
cially in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where that court
has refused to apply Rule 407 in strict products liability ac-
tions.' 2  The First,13  Second,"' Third,' 5  Fourth, 6  Fifth, 7
" See Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975) (rule against subsequent repairs not applicable against manufacturer in cause
of action based on strict liability). See also infra text accompanying notes 126-55.
"0 See supra note 6 for complete text of the rule against subsequent repairs.
" See Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs - A Rule in Need
of Repairs, 7 FORUM 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]. Schwartz believes that
the policy reasons behind Rule 407 should be tested against the experience of today's
lawyers. He submits that most repairers of products do not even know of the exclu-
sionary rule and that therefore the rule does not achieve its purpose. Furthermore,
Schwartz contends that lawyers who know of the rule against subsequent repairs still
advise their clients to repair injury-causing products to avoid additional lawsuits. Id.
at 6.
Schwartz also submits that the basic policy underlying Rule 407, that of encourag-
ing repairs, is not and never was a valid one, because there is no empirical data dem-
onstrating that the exclusion of subsequent repair evidence has resulted in a single
repair. Because he believes that Rule 407 deprives the trier of fact of crucial evidence,
without "any corresponding benefit to society", Schwartz advocates that the rule
against subsequent repairs be abolished. Id. at 7. See also Note, Products Liability
and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837 [hereinafter cited as Note,
Products Liability]; Comment, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today,
and Tommorrow, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 421 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Evidence].
" Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980) (rule against subsequent
repairs does not apply to actions based on strict liability); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562
F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of subsequent remedial actions admissible in strict
liability cause of action); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of subsequent remedial warning admissible in strict lia-
bility count).
" Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916
(1978). In Roy the plaintiff was injured while inspecting electropladed work. The in-
jury-causing machine was manufactured by Star Chopper Company and was provided
to plaintiff's company without any safety guard or warnings of the possible dangers.
The plaintiff's hand was severely damaged when it caught in the machine's punch
rollers. Even after eleven operations, the plaintiff's hand had only 5% of its function-
ing ability. At trial plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that Star Chopper re-
paired the machine after the accident. The trial court refused to admit the evidence,
citing the general rule against the admission of subsequent repair evidence. On ap-
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Sixth,18 and Seventh' 9 Circuits, however, continue to apply
peal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's position on Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 without discussion. While it may be unclear as to why the First
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the rule against subsequent repairs, it is clear that
it, like the majority, has adopted the rule.
" Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2036
(1982). In Cann, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, were injured when the car in which
they were riding slipped out of the "park" gear and into "reverse." At trial they at-
tempted to establish their strict product liability action by introducing evidence that
subsequent to the plaintiffs' accident, Ford corrected the gearshift problems of the
model of car that had caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Citing Federal Rule of Evidence
407, the trial court refused to admit this evidence. On appeal the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court. The appellate court reasoned that al-
though Rule 407 does not refer to strict liability, Rule 407 does encompass actions
brought in strict liability. While noting that negligence and strict liability are distin-
guishable, "no distinction between the two justifies the admission of subsequent re-
medial measures in strict products liability actions." Id. at 60. In arriving at its deci-
sion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on Werner v. Upjohn Co.,
628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) as authority. Werner
is considered as one of the strongest pronouncements in favor of applying Rule 407 to
strict products liability actions. See infra notes 157-87 and accompanying text.
"I Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982). In Josephs the plaintiff was
injured while cleaning a printing press manufactured by Harris Corporation. Alleging
that the press was defectively designed, the plaintiff sued on a theory of products
liability. At trial the plaintiff's evidence regarding remedial action undertaken by the
defendant subsequent to the plaintiff's injury was not admitted. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of this evidence, holding that where neither
ownership, control or feasibility is in controversy, Rule 407 precludes admission of
subsequent repair evidence.
16 Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981). See infra notes 157-87 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
Werner decision and rationale.
" Grenada Steel Indus. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983). In Gre-
nada, a fire and explosion occurred in one of the Grenada plants. Alleging that the
cause of the accident was the ignition of acetylene gas which had escaped from a
faulty valve, Grenada sued Alabama Oxygen Company, the supplier of the valve. The
manufacturer of the valve was also joined as a defendant. At trial the plaintiff at-
tempted to introduce evidence that subsequent to the fire/explosion, the manufac-
turer changed the design of the valve. The district court excluded the evidence. On
appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that the case was one of first im-
pression, affirmed the decision of the lower court by adopting the majority position
that subsequent repair evidence is inadmissible in a strict products liability action.
The court set forth two reasons which led it to adopt Rule 407. First, the court
stressed that voluntary change to improve a product is a policy that should be en-
couraged. Admission of subsequent repair evidence would effectively deter this prac-
tice, thereby encouraging a manufacturer to leave an unsafe product on the market.
Second, the court expressed the opinion that subsequent repair evidence has little
relevance in establishing antecedent negligence and therefore has no probative value.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected the argument that such evi-
dence does have probative value in that a manufacturer is unlikely to alter a product
19831
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Rule 407 in strict products liability actions. The Ninth Circuit
has had the issue before it, but as of yet that court has not
ruled on the applicability of Rule 407 to products liability
actions."
In light of this controversy among the circuits, an examina-
tion of the doctrine of subsequent repairs seems appropriate.
This comment will examine the evolution of the doctrine of
subsequent repairs - the early case law, the codification of
unless the alteration is feasible and makes the product safer. The court reasoned that
such an argument, made by "such dubious experts as judges, lawyers, and law profes-
sors, suffers[s] from excessive reliance on logical deduction and surmise without the
benefit of evidence of industry practice or economic factors." Id. at 887-88. It is evi-
dent from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Grenada that the circuit has
adopted both the rule against subsequent repairs and the policy reasons that underlie
it.
is Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982). In Hall, the plaintiff, a
seaman, was injured while working on the deck of a ship. He sought to introduce
evidence that after the accident the practice of hosing down the deck was discontin-
ued. The trial court admitted this evidence over the defendant's objection. On appeal
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's decision, holding that
Rule 407 proscribes admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. While
noting the split in the federal courts on the applicability of Rule 407 to strict liability
cases, the court was nevertheless of the opinion that subsequent repair evidence
should not be admitted in strict liability actions. In so ruling the court adopted the
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981), discussed infra notes 157-87
and accompanying text. The court's decision in Hall affirmed its earlier decision in
Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980), thus
confirming the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals position on Rule 407 and strict
liability.
1, Oberst v. Int'l Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980). In Oberst the plain-
tiffs were injured as a result of a collision in a vehicle manufactured by International
Harvester Company. They alleged that both the cab of the vehicle and the sleeping
compartment were defectively designed. At trial the plaintiffs were not permitted to
introduce evidence that subsequent to the accident the defendant changed the design
of the sleeping compartment. On appeal the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the lower court, citing "the long established rule that proof of repairs subse-
quent to an accident is not admissible to prove negligence in a tort action." Id. at 866.
It is not clear, however, whether the decision in Oberst was based on Rule 407 or on
Illinois law; even so, the Oberst opinion may be read as indicating that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals leans toward the adoption of the majority opinion.
so In Longenecker v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to review a case involving strict lia-
bility and Rule 407. The defendant, however, did not object to the admission of sub-
sequent repair evidence, so the court failed to "reach the question whether 'culpable
conduct' for purpose of. . . [Rule 407] includes a manufacturer's strict product liabil-
ity." Id. at 1286.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 407, the exceptions to the rule, and
the application of the Rule to strict products liability cases.
Finally, a projection will be suggested as to the future of the
doctrine itself.
I. EARLY CASE LAW
As early as the late nineteenth century, judges saw the
need for a rule of evidence which would prevent the admission
of evidence of post-accident repairs.2 1 Courts established two
basic reasons for why they believed this evidence should be
inadmissible. The first reason involves relevance.2 Evidence
of remedial measures taken after an accident is irrelevant to
2 See, e.g., Columbia & P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892). In Columbia,
the plaintiff was injured when a pulley fell on him. At trial the plaintiff was allowed
to show that after the accident the defendant changed the design of the pulley to
prevent a recurrence of the accident. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court
stated why such a rule was needed:
[T]he taking of such precautions against the future is not to be con-
strued as an admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate
tendency to prove that the defendant had been negligent before the
accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the jury
from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant.
Id. at 207. Columbia, along with Terre Haute & I.R.R. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 23 N.E.
965 (1890) and Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358
(1883), represented the reasoning followed by the majority of jurisdictions. See infra
notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
22 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EvID. 401. This definition of relevance is derived from the common law development
of the concept. United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 776 (9th Cir. 1975). According
to the advisory committee note to Rule 401, "relevancy is not an inherent characteris-
tic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence
and a matter properly provable in the case." The trial judge has broad discretion in
determining what evidence is relevant and what is not. Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am.,
596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1979); see also FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Because relevance is
determined on a case by case basis, there are a great profusion of definitions. While
not worded exactly like Rule 401, most come very close in meaning to the federal
rule. Two examples suffice to illustrate this premise. In United States v. Carter, 522
F.2d 666, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court defined the test for relevancy as "whether
proffered evidence has a tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less proba-
ble than would be the case without benefit of the evidence." In United States v. Al-
lison, 474 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that evidence is relevant "when
it is persuasive or indicative that a fact in controversy did or did not exist because
the conclusion in question may be logically inferred from that evidence."
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the issue of a defendant's conduct prior to the accident.2 3 The
defendant's conduct immediately prior to the accident is the
type of evidence which is probative of whether the defendant
breached his duty of care.24 Because it is this evidence which
is at issue, evidence of post-accident repairs has little proba-
tive value, for it is just as likely that an injury was caused by
accident, contributory negligence, or any other logical reason
as it was by the instrumentality the defendant subsequently
altered.2  Furthermore, evidence of subsequent repair can be
highly prejudicial, because jurors are apt to construe the sub-
sequent change as an admission of guilt by the defendant,
even if admitted with a proper limiting instruction.2
The second reason evidence of post-accident repair is usu-
ally excluded is the one relied upon most frequently by the
courts. The public policy of encouraging, or at least not dis-
couraging, manufacturers to take remedial safety measures
has been of great concern to courts in maintaining the doc-
trine.2 7 If evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible, a de-
fendant, knowing that any improvement he makes in a prod-
uct may be used as evidence that that product was previously
unsafe, would be extremely unlikely to improve any product. 28
:3 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5; J. WIGMORE, supra note 5.
24 Comment, Ault v. International Harvester Co. - Death Knell to the Exclusion-
ary Rule Against Subsequent Remedial Conduct in Strict Products Liability, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 208, 210 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
25 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5; J. WIGMORE, supra note 5. See also Columbia
& P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) ("[Tihe taking of such precautions
against the future. . .has no legitmate tendency to prove that the defendant had been
negligent before the accident happened .... "); Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis
Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358, 359 (1883) (subsequent repairs "afford no legitimate
basis for construing such an act as an admission of previous neglect of duty.").
20 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, cited in Note, Products Liability, supra note 11, at
841.
27 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5; J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, Comment, An Excep-
tion to the Exceptions: The Subsequent Repair Rule in Montana, 42 MONT. L. REv.
143, 145 (1981).
'a J. WIGMORE, supra note 5. Wigmore was a leading advocate for the exclusion of
evidence of post-accident repair on this ground:
[T]he admission of [post-accident repairs], even though theoretically
not plainly improper, would be liable to over-emphasis by the jury,
and would discourage all owners, even those who had genuinely been
careful, from improving the place or thing that had caused the injury,
because they would fear the evidential use of such acts to their disad-
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For this reason, courts have excluded evidence not only of
post-accident repair, but also of installation of safety de-
vices,29 changes in company rules,30 and discharge of employ-
ees." The exclusion of evidence in these circumstances is fur-
ther justified when one considers that a manufacturer may
change a product for reasons other than safety. Functional,
aesthetic, and economic factors are all plausible explanations
of a change in design.32
Three cases from the latter part of the nineteenth century
set the groundwork for the exclusionary rule against subse-
vantage; and thus not only would careful owners refrain from improve-
ments, but even careless ones, who might have deserved to have the
evidence adduced against them, would by refraining from improve-
ments subject innocent persons to the risk of the recurrence of the
injury.
Id.
29 See, e.g., Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 170 Wash. 494, 16 P.2d 824 (1932).
In Hatcher, plaintiff suffered lead poisoning as a result of ingesting lead particles at
work. At trial he was permitted to show that after the incident the defendant in-
stalled a blower to alleviate the lead poisoning problem. The appellate court reversed
the lower court's decision to admit the evidence, holding that the general rule against
subsequent repairs prohibited the admission of such evidence. The court expressed
the opinion that subsequent alterations have no tendency whatever to show that the
conditions were unsafe prior to the accident.
So See, e.g., Ware v. Boston & M.R.R., 92 N.H. 373, 31 A.2d 58 (1943). In Ware, the
plaintiff's decedent died in a collision between a truck and train. The trial court ex-
cluded testimony that following the accident, the defendant adopted a traffic regula-
tion limiting the speed at which its trains may cross intersections. On appeal, the
court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony, holding that "[wihatever defendent
may have done after the accident, as an additional safeguard for the protection of the
traveling public against a recurrence of such accident as this one, is not evidence of
previous negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. ... 31 A.2d at 60.
31 See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Skene, 153 F. 241 (1st Cir. 1907). In Armour the
plaintiff was injured when a runaway team collided with a buggy in which he was
sitting. At trial the plaintiff was allowed to show that the driver of the team was fired
after the accident. On appeal, the decision of the lower court was affirmed. The court
noted, however, that the admission of the evidence was technical error, but not of
such import as to require reversal of the trial court. In determining that the evidence
should have been excluded, the court pointed out that "a hundred things may have
happened during the year to cause the discharge. It may have been that he was dis-
charged because he was profane, or because he advised co-employees to demand more
pay or less hours." Id. at 245.
" Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 125, 528 P.2d 1148, 1155, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 819 (1975) (Clark, J., dissenting), cited in Comment, supra note 24, at 211.
See also V. WALKOWIAK, THE TRIMAL OF THE PRODucTs LIABILITY CASE 2-8 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as V. WALKOWIAK].
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
quent repairs.33 In Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad v.
Hawthorne, s, an employee of the defendant saw-mill corpora-
tion was injured when a large pulley fell upon him.3 5 The em-
ployee sued the defendant on a theory of negligence for failure
to provide a safe and non-defective machine." At trial the
employee was permitted to show that the defendant had
changed the design of the machine to prevent the same acci-
dent from recurring. The Supreme Court, in reversing the
lower court, which had allowed the evidence into the record,
cited both precedent and policy as reasons for prohibiting the
admission of the evidence. 8
Specifically, the Court relied upon the relevance theory 9 in
arriving at its decision. It held that the evidence is incompe-
tent because "the taking of such precautions [subsequent re-
pairs] against the future is not to be construed as an admis-
sion of responsibility for the past."' 0 The Court reasoned that
the English rule, espoused by Baron Bramwell in Hart v. Lan-
cashire & Yorkshire Railway," should be equally applicable
in America, that "people do not furnish evidence against
themselves simply by adopting a new plan in order to prevent
the recurrence of an accident."' 2
In Terre Haute & Indiana Railroad v. Clem,43 the plain-
tiff's horse was injured at a crossing of a public road and a
railroad track." Plaintiff sued the defendant railroad com-
pany in negligence for breach of duty in constructing the
crossing.'5 The trial judge permitted the plaintiff to show that
after the accident, the railroad company changed and repaired
" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5.
144 U.S. 202 (1892).
88 Id.
I' ld.
37 Id. at 203.
88 Id. at 206-09. The Court relied heavily on Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30
Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358 (1883), discussed infra, notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 22 for discussion of the relevance theory.
Columbia, 144 U.S. at 207 (1892).
21 L.T.R. n.s. 261 (1869).
Id. at 263.
48 123 Ind. 15, 23 N.E. 965 (1890).
' 23 N.E. at 965.
46 Id.
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the crossing." Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the
appellate court on the ground that acts of post-accident re-
pairs afford no legitimate basis for construing such an act as
an admission of previous neglect of duty.47 A defendant's con-
duct, the court said, is to be measured prior to the accident,
not after, for "no one is bound to anticipate and to provide
against unusual and unexpected accidents."4
In arriving at its decision, the appellate court cited the pol-
icy reasons behind the rule against subsequent repair as de-
manding such a result. First, the court held that evidence of
post-accident repairs is irrelevant to the issue of the negli-
gence of the defendant prior to the accident, a conclusion
which is supported by well-settled principles.4 Second, the
court reasoned that defendants would be discouraged from re-
pairing products if evidence of subsequent repairs were ad-
missible.5 0 Such a rule that admits evidence of subsequent re-
pairs operates to ". . . deter men from profiting by
experience, and availing themselves of new information" and
"has nothing to commend it, for it is neither expedient nor
just." 1
In Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad, 51 a railroad
company was sued for negligence in maintaining its track, an
act which allegedly resulted in the death of one of its engi-
neers.53 At trial, the plaintiff was allowed to show that after
the accident, the defendant repaired the allegedly defective
46 Id. at 966.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. The court relied on Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 16
N.W. 358 (1883), and Nalley v. Hartford Carpet Co., 51 Conn. 524 (1884) as establish-
ing the "well-settled principle." 23 N.E. at 966.
0 Id. The court cited an example of a mill owner who repairs or improves the mill
after an accident has occurred. The court stated that the "just inference is not that
he was previously guilty of negligence, but that, prompted by humane motives and
influenced by the new information supplied by the fact that an accident has hap-
pened, he has... taken such precautionary measures as to render it impossible that
any one should be injured in the future." Id.
51 Id.
61 30 Minn. 465, 16 N.W. 358 (1883).
58 16 N.W. at 358.
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switch. 4 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
The appellate court concluded that the admission of the evi-
dence of subsequent repairs amounted to reversible error,
holding that to allow evidence of post-accident repair would
be to hold out "an inducement for continued negligence." ' ,6
The court determined that evidence of subsequent repair
"afford[s] no legitimate basis for construing such an act as an
admission of previous neglect of duty. '5 7 As such evidence
pertaining to post-accident repairs is irrelevant to the defen-
dant's antecedent negligence, and is therefore inadmissible.
These three cases are representative of the holdings of every
jurisdiction under common law except for one.58 The courts
were firmly convinced that evidence of post-accident repairs
was incompetent and therefore inadmissible to show a defen-
dant's antecedent negligence because such evidence had no
bearing on the conduct of the defendant prior to the accident
and tended to inflame the jury against the defendant. 9 Ex-
"4 Id. at 359.
I d.
Id. The court, in one of the most frequently quoted opinions on subsequent re-
pairs, explained why such evidence should be excluded:
A person may have exercised all the care which the law required, and
yet in light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has
occurred, and as a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt addi-
tional safeguards. The more careful a person is, the more regard he has
for the lives of others, the more likely he would be to do so, and it
would seem unjust that he could not do so without being liable to have
such acts construed as an admission of prior negligence. We think such
a rule puts an unfair interpretation upon human conduct, and virtu-
ally holds out an inducement for continued negligence.
Id.
57 Id.
Comment, Evidence, supra note 11, at 421. The author states that while every
jurisdiction in the United States had a common law rule against subsequent repairs
except Kansas, not all of these jurisdictions adopted the rule per se when they codi-
fied their evidence law. For examples of three such statutes, see MAINE EvID. 407(a),
HAWAII R. EvID. 407 and ALASKA R. Evw. 407.
At common law Kansas refused to exclude evidence of subsequent repairs. How-
ever, it adopted the federal rule against subsequent repairs when it enacted its state
rules of evidence. See KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-451 (Vernon 1976).
so See, e.g., Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957)
(evidence of subsequent repairs of step by landlord inadmissible as proof of negli-
gence); Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 350 U.S. 937 (1955) (reports of experiments conducted following an accident
inadmissible because of possible misuse by jury).
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cept for a few judicial exceptions,"0 courts adhered to this
common law rule of evidence until 1975.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Among the rules enacted was Federal Rule of Evidence 407,
entitled "Subsequent Remedial Measures." 1 Part of Con-
gress' intent in codifying Rule 407 was to transform the vast
common law development of the doctrine of subsequent re-
pairs into a single rule,a which now reads as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken pre-
viously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evi-
dence of the subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove neg-
ligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment."
In enacting Rule 407, however, it was intended that the com-
mon law doctrine of subsequent repair complement the fed-
eral rule, thus allowing prior judicial decisions to fill the gaps
that were certain to appear. 4
Examples of judicial exceptions to the general rule against subsequent repairs
are as follows: (1) evidence of change in policy, see Dorssom v. Kansas Power & Light
Co., 174 Kan. 472, 257 P.2d 151 (1953) (evidence of subsequent change in policy held
admissible in negligence action); (2) evidence to show duty to repair, see Wailner v.
Kitchens of Sara Lee, 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969) (discussed infra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text); (3) evidence of repairs made by third party, see Brown v. Quick
Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969) (discussed infra notes 89-96 and ac-
companying text); (4) evidence to establish control of instrumentality, see infra notes
71-82 and accompanying text; (5) evidence to establish feasibility of precautionary
measure, see infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text; and (6) evidence to impeach,
see infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
6o FED. R. EvID. 407.
62 K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE MANUAL, 162-65 (2d ed.
1977); FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
63 FED. R. EVID. 407.
6 This view was espoused by the Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d
848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The court held that:
It is clear that in enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence Congress did
not intend to wipe out the years of common law development in the
field of evidence, indeed the contrary is true. The new rules contain
19831
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Perhaps the more important reason why Rule 407 was codi-
fied was that gaps were already beginning to appear in the
common law doctrine and the rule against subsequent repair
had begun to lose its vitality."" These gaps were in the form of
prominent exceptions to the exclusionary rule and uneven ap-
plication of the doctrine by the courts, causing the rule to be
seen by some as a positive rule of admissibility rather than a
rule of exclusion. Unless the issue is defendant's negligence,
the criticism goes, evidence of subsequent repairs will always
be admissible."
The second sentence of Rule 407 specifically enumerates the
exceptions to the rule: "This rule does not require the exclu-
sion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for an-
other purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibil-
ity of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.""7 According to the advisory committee note to
Rule 407, the list of exceptions to the rule is not exhaustive,
but merely illustrative." Other widely-accepted exceptions in-
cluded the duty of the defendant to repair 9 and changes
made by a third party who is not the defendant.70 A brief ex-
many gaps and omissions and in order to answer the unresolved ques-
tions courts certainly should rely on common law precedent. This is
true with respect to Rule 407 which merely enacts the common law
rule.
Id. at 856 (citation omitted).
For examples of the courts' application of Rule 407, see supra notes 13-18.
" Schwartz, supra note 11. The commentator states that the rule against subse-
quent repairs is so eroded that it could not "achieve the worthwhile policy goal it
purports to accomplish. ... Id. at 7.
" See Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) cited in
Note, Products Liability, supra note 7, at 895. The court stated: "Evidence of post-
accident repairs or changes is properly introduced for any purpose except to demon-
strate the negligence of the defendant." 419 F.2d at 1032.
6 FED. R. EvID. 407.
6 FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note; Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,
856 (4th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 996 (1981) (stating that "the exceptions
listed in Rule 407 - ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary measures (if
controverted), and impeachment are illustrative and not exhaustive." Id.
'9 Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969) (evidence of sub-
sequent repairs properly admitted to indicate defendant possessed a duty to repair);
Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95 (1965) (evidence is admissible to show a
defect which the defendant had a duty to repair).
70 See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Williams, 370 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1966) (evidence
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amination of the major exceptions to Rule 407 will demon-
strate what remains of the vitality of the rule against subse-
quent repairs.
A. Control/Ownership
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 specifically allows admission
of evidence of subsequent measures offered to show that the
defendant had control or ownership of the premises or instru-
mentality involved in the accident.71 For example, in Wallner
v. Kitchens of Sara Lee,7 plaintiff was allowed to present evi-
dence that showed that Sara Lee had subsequently repaired
the allegedly defective machinery." In Wallner, plaintiff was
injured when his hand caught in a vertical conveyer unit used
in defendant's kitchen.7 4 He sued Sara Lee on a theory of neg-
ligence. 6 At trial the plaintiff was permitted to show that
Sara Lee made several alterations in the conveyor unit, in-
stalling a safety guard and adding extra lubricators.76 On ap-
peal, the decision to admit the evidence was affirmed.77 The
court held that, while normally post-accident repair evidence
is excluded, in this instance the evidence was admissible, for
control of the machine was a controverted issue, and the evi-
dence established that Sara Lee had control of the conveyor.78
One must take note, however, that when evidence is admitted
for the limited purpose of establishing control or ownership, it
is not to be construed by the jury as an admission of defen-
dant's fault.7 9 Upon request, a defendant can obtain an in-
struction limiting the use of such evidence to the issue for
of subsequent repairs made by a municipality admissible when evidence has no bear-
ing on defendant's negligence); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d
205 (1969) (evidence of subsequent repairs by plaintiff's employer admissible when
employer not joined as defendant).
FED. R. EvID. 407; 32B Am. Jur. 2d Federal Rules of Evidence § 139 (1982).
419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
73 Id. at 1032.
7, Id. at 1031.
78 Id.
76 Id. at 1032.
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 C. MCCORMICK supra note 5.
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which it is admitted.80 The danger in admitting this type of
evidence under any of the exceptions to the general rule is
that the jury may ignore the instruction and perceive the evi-
dence of the subsequent repairs as an admission of prior negli-
gence."1 In spite of this danger, however, evidence has consist-
ently been admitted to establish control or ownership.8
B. Feasibility of Precautionary Measures
The second, and probably most controversial of the excep-
tions to the rule against subsequent repairs involves the feasi-
bility of precautionary measures.88 Evidence of subsequent re-
pairs is admissible to prove feasibility of precautionary
measures when the defendant denies that such a precaution
was actually feasible.84 One commentator, however has sug-
80 Id.
81 Note, Products Liability supra note 11, at 850; see also Bauman v. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (failure of trial court to
give limiting instruction after admitting subsequent repair evidence reversible error).
S See, e.g., Landrum v. DeBruycker, 240 N.W.2d 119 (1976) (evidence of post-acci-
dent repairs admitted in negligence action where plaintiff was injured when his Volk-
swagen collided with a cow; the court permitted the evidence to be admitted, stating
that "the admission of such evidence to establish control . . . can be highly prejudi-
cial and remains within the discretion of the trial judge.") see also Powers v. J.B.
Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964) (evidence of subsequent repairs admissi-
ble to establish defendant's control of premises); Dubonowski v. Howard Savings
Inst., 124 N.J.L. 368, 12 A.2d 384 (1941) (evidence of landlord's subsequent repair of
stairs admissible to show landlord's control of the stairs); Scudero v. Campbell, 288
N.Y. 328, 43 N.E.2d 66, (1942) (subsequent repair of stairs admissible to show land-
lord's control of building).
83 The reason this exception is so problematic is that feasibility must actually be
controverted before evidence of it is admissible. See FED. R. EvD. 407. Problems arise
as to when feasibility is actually at issue, for when feasibility is not stipulated, often
the trial must be fully developed before the determination of controverted feasibility
may be made. By that time damaging evidence of post-accident repairs may already
have been admitted to establish feasibility. If the defendant stipulates that a certain
change was feasible, evidence of subsequent repair can never be admissible on that
premise. An example of this is found in Burks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 633
F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981), where the court, after noting that the defendants agreed
with the plaintiff that an alternative design was feasible, stated, "[Diefendants en-
tered the stipulation to gain the benefit of Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which ex-
cludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove the feasibility of taking
such measures at the time of an accident if feasibility is not controverted." Id. at
1153.
s4 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK supra note 5, § 275 n.21 (listing cases holding evidence
of post-accident repairs admissible on this basis).
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gested that such a denial would be imprudent, because usually
the defendant knows the repairs were made."5 While a defen-
dant can cut off the plaintiff's attempt to introduce such evi-
dence by admitting feasibility, 6 this should not be done hap-
hazardly. Not only must the stipulation of feasibility conform
completely to the plaintiff's evidence, 7 but also there is a dis-
tinct possibility that the evidence nevertheless may be admit-
ted under another exception.8 The possibilities of abuse of
this exception are very real. In Brown v. Quick Mix Co.,89 the
Washington state court held that evidence of post-accident re-
pair is admissible no matter which side raises the issue of pre-
cautionary measures. In Brown, the plaintiff lost three fingers
and part of his right hand when his hand was caught in an
earth-boring drill." The plaintiff sued both the manufacturer
and retailer in strict products liability.91 At trial the plaintiff
was permitted to show that on the day of the accident the
plaintiff's employer installed a safety guard on the drill to
prevent a recurrence of the accident.92 The trial court admit-
ted this evidence to show feasibility of guarding the drill.'3
Before the trial, the defendant had admitted the feasibility of
such a safety device so the issue was not in controversy.' 4 The
appellate court affirmed the admission of this evidence, hold-
so Lloyd, Admissiblility of Evidence of Post Accident Repairs: The Graying of a
Black Letter Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 400 (1975). Lloyd goes on to say that the defen-
dant need not plead unfeasibility for the issue to be raised; he cites one case where
plaintiff was allowed to use subsequent repair evidence to rebut a statement in defen-
dant's opening argument concerning feasibility. Id.
" See supra note 83. See also Burks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 633 F.2d 1152
(5th Cir. 1981) (defendant stipulated feasibility of design alternative to gain benefit
of Rule 407).
e' Lloyd, supra note 85, at 405.
'Id.
89 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969).
454 P.2d at 207. Plaintiff's job entailed manually guiding the drill to a particular
position for drilling a hole. Once the drill was in position, a crane lowered the drill
into the hole while plaintiff guided it with his hands. Id.
" Id.
92 Id. The guard was in the shape of a truncated cone, which when welded onto the
drill, permitted the drill to be guided into position without the operator actually
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ing that because the plaintiff's employer, not a party to the
lawsuit, had made the subsequent repair, there was no danger
that the jury would construe the repair as an admission of the
defendants' negligence.96 The dissenting judge in Brown at-
tacked the majority's decision for improperly allowing the
plaintiff to "initially inject evidence of feasibility", into the
trial enabling the jury to find the defendants negligent "on
evidence admitted on an issue [the defendants] neither cre-
ated nor contested." 96 Despite the dangers apparent in Brown,
feasibility remains readily available as a vehicle for introduc-
ing evidence of post-accident repairs.9
C. Impeachment
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 allows the admission of evi-
dence of subsequent repairs for purposes of impeaching wit-
nesses or testimony. e8 When a defendant asserts that all rea-
sonable care had been exercised at the time of an occurrence,
the plaintiff may attack that contention by showing later re-
pairs inconsistent with the defendant's assertion." Admission
under this exception may take a variety of forms. According
to one commentator, "where the evidence of repairs tends to
contradict or impeach on a material point it will be admissi-
ble."100 An example of the admission of evidence of subse-
quent repairs under the impeachment exception is found in
"' Id. at 210. The court opined that since the defendants had not made the repairs,
"the fact that such changes were made could not conceivably raise in the minds of the
jury an inference that the appellant [defendant] had admitted it was negligent ....
Id.
Id. at 211.
97 See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff
permitted to show specific changes made by defendant although defendant had previ-
ously admitted that such changes were possible; so long as the final emphasis was on
the defect, such evidence would not incriminate the defendant in a negligence action).
ga 38B Am. Jur. 2d Federal Rules of Evidence § 141. (1982) See Lloyd, supra note
85, at 404 for a brief discussion of admissibility under this exception.
11 See, e.g., Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 18 Cal. 2d, 798, 117 P.2d 841 (1941) (plaintiff
permitted to show on cross-examination that defendant's earlier contention about
safety was false through use of evidence of subsequent repair); Hickey v. Kansas City
S. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956) (evidence of subsequent repair of railroad crossing
admissible to rebut defendant's contention that repair was impossible).
100 Lloyd, supra note 85, at 404 (citing a variety of Iowa cases admitting post-acci-
dent repairs for impeachment purposes).
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American Airlines, Inc. v. United States.'0' In that case the
plaintiff's decedent died when the airplane in which he was a
passenger crashed while making a landing." 2 The plaintiff
sued American Airlines for negligence. 03 At trial plaintiff was
permitted to use evidence of subsequent repairs to rebut the
testimony of defendant's witnesses concerning feasibility and
safety.104 Specifically, plaintiff was allowed to prove that
American had changed the face of the drum type altimeter,
one of three altimeters in use on board the airplane at the
time of the crash. 08 This evidence was crucial to the lawsuit,
for it helped the plaintiff establish that the pilot had been
negligent in that he had read the incorrect altimeter on ap-
proach to land, and that therefore American was liable.106
Plaintiff was also allowed to introduce evidence that following
the accident, American changed the pilots' cockpit proce-
dure. 1 07 American objected to the admission of this evidence
on the ground that evidence of subsequent remedial action is
inadmissible to prove antecedent negligence. 08 The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's ruling admitting the evi-
dence, for the appellate court opined that the evidence was
used to impeach earlier testimony stating that the changes
were unfeasible.109 Evidence of the alteration of the drum type
altimeter was properly admitted to rebut defendant's testi-
mony that the original instrument was not only safe, but that
there was also no reason to change its design."0 Furthermore,
evidence of the addition of the extra pilot in the cockpit was
101 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
lO Id. at 182-83.
I10 Id.
Io ld. at 196.
'0' Id. All three altimeters are mounted on the same panel in a Boeing 727, the
airplane involved in this crash. Altimeters one and two are set to indicate the altitude
of the aircraft above the airport. Altimeter number three indicates altitude above
mean sea level. Id.
I" Id. at 188.
107 Id. at 196-97. This evidence was especially damaging to American, for through it
plaintiff was able to establish that since the crash, American requires an additional
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properly admitted to rebut the testimony of an American Air-
lines pilot that such procedure was unfeasible."' Because the
evidence of American's subsequent remedial actions was of-
fered to impeach contradictory testimony, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the evidence came within the impeachment
exception and was therefore properly admitted." 2 Similar to
the exceptions which allow proof of control/ownership and
feasibility, the exception to the rule against subsequent re-
pairs based on impeachment has enjoyed wide-spread usage.
This wide-spread usage of the impeachment exception has
caused some commentators to urge that the general rule
against admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs be
abolished." 3
In light of the recognized exceptions to the rule against sub-
sequent repairs, it appears that an attorney of even minimal
ingenuity can find some way to admit evidence of subsequent
repairs."" Professor McCormick warned, however, that the
free admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
likely to defeat the public policy of encouraging repairs."'
Others contend that the social policy is unsupportable or no
longer relevant."' Almost all agree that the rule against sub-
sequent repairs has lost much of its vitality."'
,.. Id. at 196-97.
I' d. at 196.
" See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 7.
J" j. WEINSTEIN AND M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 407-10 (1975) cited in
Comment, Evidence, supra note 11, at 424-25 n.29: "As Professor Slough observed:
'Opportunities for circumscribing the purpose of the rule are legion, and it is quite
evident that admission or exclusion will be judged on the basis of subtle trial
manuevers ....
.. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5. McCormick suggests that before such evidence is
admitted under any of the exceptions the court should be satisfied that the issue on
which it is offered is of substantial importance, and is actually, and not merely for-
mally in dispute, that the plaintiff cannot establish the fact to be inferred conve-
niently by other proof, and consequently that the need for the evidence outweighs the
danger of its misuse. Id.
" See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 6.
' See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 7; Comment,
supra note 24, at 230.
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III. RULE 407 AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Recently, with the development of the strict products liabil-
ity theory, the rule against admission of evidence of subse-
quent remedial action has been weakened even further. As
discussed above, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct.118 A ma-
jor question has arisen as to whether the rule against subse-
quent repairs is applicable to strict products liability actions,
where negligence and culpable conduct are not at issue."9 In
order for a plaintiff to establish a cause of action in strict
products liability, he must show that the product was defec-
tive, that the defendant had control over the product when
the defect occurred, and that the product caused the plain-
tiff's injuries.120 In a strict liability action the manufacturer is
not on trial, but rather the product itself. 21 The manufac-
turer's conduct is irrelevant in strict liability; only the prod-
uct's defectiveness, control of the product when the defect oc-
curred, and causation between the plaintiff's injury and the
defect need be established."' As such, evidence which helps to
establish any of the elements of strict liability should be ad-
mitted. Because negligence is not at issue, a defendant need
not worry that evidence of subsequent repairs will be seen as
an admission of fault.123 Therefore, evidence of post-accident
repairs is relevant to establish a defect in the product by
showing the availability of safer alternatives or that a higher
11 See supra notes 34-57 and accompanying text.
11 The basic theory of strict liability is set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965). For text of Section 402A, see supra note 8.
20 See supra note 8 for a general discussion of strict liability.
"I Lloyd, supra note 85, at 408. Lloyd asserts that when the product itself is on
trial, the fact of a repair having been made subsequently bears directly on the issues
of defectiveness and control by the defendant over the product. Id. at 408-09. See
also Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749,
753 (1972), cited in Note, Subsequently Remedying Strict Products Liability: Cann
v. Ford, 14 CONN. L. REV. 759, 769 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Note, Subsequently
Remedying] ("[In strict liability] policy considerations are involved which shift the
emphasis from the defendant manufacturer's conduct to the character of the
product").
2 See supra note 8.
113 Note, Products Liability, supra note 11, at 846.
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level of safety was attainable by the defendant.'"4 This type of
evidence is also probative of the extent of the defendant's
control over the product, for if a defendant subsequently re-
pairs a product, it follows that he must have had the defect
under his control. 125 When plaintiff sues on a strict liability
theory, evidence of post-accident repairs may be very helpful
in determining the elements of strict liability.
A. The Case Against Applying Rule 407 to Strict Products
Liability: Ault v. International Harvester Co.
In Ault v. International Harvester Co., 126 the California
Supreme Court, a leading advocate of strict products liabil-
ity,12 7 considered a case in which the plaintiff was seriously
injured when the vehicle in which he was a passenger plunged
500 feet to the bottom of a canyon.' After the accident, it
was discovered that the vehicle's gear box had broken. 129 The
plaintiff contended that the gear box had broken prior to the
accident, and the defendant claimed the box had broken on
impact.130 The plaintiff sued under the theories of negligence,
strict products liability and breach of warranty. 31 The plain-
tiff supported his contention by showing that the gear box was
made of an inferior metal and offered into evidence the fact
that three years after the accident the defendant had substi-
tuted a much stronger metal in the construction of gear boxes
for vehicles like the one in question.13 2 The trial court ac-
cepted this evidence into the record. 3 3
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the admission of the
evidence violated the California rule against proof of subse-
", Lloyd, supra note 85, at 409.
128 Id.
12 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
"" What is generally acknowledged as the first strict products liability case was
decided in California. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See supra note 8 for a discussion of Greenman.
128 Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 110, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (1975).
12 Id.
130 Id.
121 Id. at 110, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
1 Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
133 Id.
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quent repairs. 13 The state supreme court, however, refused to
accept the defendant's position, holding that the language and
legislative history of the California rule made the doctrine in-
applicable to a strict products liability action.3M The court
then refused to judicially extend the rule against subsequent
repairs to strict products liability actions.'36
In overruling the defendant's contention that the California
rule against subsequent repairs should be applicable in strict
products liability actions, the Ault court employed a two-part
analysis. 137 The first part involved the distinction between
strict liability and negligence. Negligence, the Ault court
stated, involves affirmative fault, a term specifically related to
"culpable conduct", " ' the phrase employed in Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 to describe conduct for which post-accident re-
pair evidence is inadmissible.'3 9 Affirmative fault, however, is
not considered in a strict liability action, and hence culpable
conduct is irrelevant. Therefore, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
is inapplicable to strict liability." 0 Instead, a court should fo-
cus on whether the product was defective, an issue which is
less blameworthy than culpable conduct."' The Ault court
reasoned that had the California Legislature intended to en-
compass strict liability cases within the scope of the California
rule against subsequent repairs, it would have used a term less
related to and consistent with affirmative fault than "culpable
conduct."'" 2
13, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1968). The California rule reads substantially like
FED. R. EVID. 407. The California rule was used as a model in drafting the federal
rule. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
M' Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814 (1975).
36 Id. The California Supreme Court opined that the California Legislature did
not specifically mention strict products liability in enacting its rule against subse-
quent repairs and that therefore the court was not compelled to apply the rule in
strict products liability actions. Id.
137 Id. at 118-19, 582 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15 (1975).
138 Id.
139 FED. R. EvID. 407.
1O Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 118-20, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
141 d.
142Id. But see Comment, supra note 24, at 214 for an opposite but equally valid
reading of the Legislative intent behind the passing of California's rule against subse-
quent repairs. Under this reading, culpable conduct is sufficiently broad to apply to
strict liability. Id. at 214-15.
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The second part of the California Supreme Court's analysis
involved the widely-accepted policy reason for the rule, that
of encouraging repairs. 143 While acknowledging that in negli-
gence actions a defendant may be deterred from making re-
pairs if such evidence could be admitted against him, the Ault
court opined that that particular policy reason was immaterial
in a products liability action. 144 One reason for this is the fact
that the theory of strict liability itself encourages defendants
to make repairs. 145 The exclusionary rule would serve only to
circumvent this policy. If the plaintiff cannot get evidence of
subsequent repairs admitted, he may have difficulty making
out his case, and the defendant will have no reason to
repair. 146
The other reason given by the Ault court for the admission
of evidence of subsequent repairs in strict liability actions is
that there are other, more persuasive reasons which encourage
a defendant to repair, and that the subsequent repair rule is
not necessary. 47 Economic considerations and the threat of
adverse publicity are two reasons why a defendant might sub-
sequently repair."48 An even more compelling reason why a de-
fendant will normally repair a product after a lawsuit-causing
incident is to avoid additional lawsuits.1 49 Moreover, the Ault
court said, the exclusionary rule does not affect the primary
conduct of the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a
'" Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 119, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (1975).
144 Id.
116 Id. See also Comment, Evidence, supra note 11, at 429.
' Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (1975); Note,
Products Liability, supra note 11 at 848.
"' Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (1975).
148 Id.
'49 The court's language is particularly effective in explaining why a defendant will
subsequently repair even if such evidence could be admitted against him:
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal prod-
ucts liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable ad-
ditional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public im-
age, simply because evidence of adoption of such improvement may be
admitted in an action founded on strict liability for recovery of an in-
jury that preceded the improvement.
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shield against potential liability.1 50
Although the California Supreme Court need not have held
that the rule against subsequent repairs was inadmissible in a
strict liability action,'6 ' in Ault v. International Harvester
Co.,15  it once again asserted itself as the forerunner in the
field of products liability. While the holding in Ault is still in
the minority, it has gained the support of the Eighth Circuit.
The Ault rationale has been applied consistently by that cir-
cuit in the following cases: Unterberger v. Snow Co., Inc.,' 3
Farner v. Paccar, Inc.,' 54 and Robbins v. Farmers Union
Grain Terminal Assoc. .' 55
B. The Case for Applying Rule 407 to Strict Products
Liability: Werner v. Upjohn Co.
A majority of the circuits, however, still choose not to follow
the Ault rationale and continue to apply the rule against sub-
sequent repairs to strict liability actions.'"" The Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Werner v. Upjohn Co.' 57 perhaps best illus-
trates the proposition that the rule against subsequent repairs
is applicable to strict liability actions. The Werner case serves
as an excellent summary of the position presently taken by
the majority of jurisidictions. 1 8
In Werner, the product at issue was a drug called Cleocin, a
broad spectrum antibiotic.' 59 Cleocin enjoyed wide usage in
the early 1970's as a substitute for penicillin.' 0 As usage be-
,00 Id. See also Comment, Evidence, supra note 11 at 429; Note, Products Liabil-
ity, supra note 11 at 845-52.
'" According to one author, the evidence in Ault could have been admitted under
the feasibility exception. See Comment, Evidence, supra note 11, at 427.
'"2 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
163 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980).
164 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
165 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977). In Robbins, the court acknowledged its reliance on
Ault in arriving at its decision: "We have applied the Ault rationale in allowing proof
of post-occurrence design modification and a subsequent remedial instruc-
tion .. "Id. at 793.
' See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
.57 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
,58 See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
169 Werner, 628 F.2d at 851.
0 Id. Cleocin was used almost exclusively as an alternative for people allergic to
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came more widespread, Upjohn, the manufacturer of Cleocin,
received reports of side effects from the use of the drug, the
most dangerous of which was a form of colitis.16 ' A number of
studies on the effects of Cleocin were made, the findings of
which were published by Upjohn in warnings which the com-
pany sent to physicians, informing them of the drug's possible
side effects.' a2 Revised warnings were sent out by Upjohn in
both 1974 and 1975.' 63
In December 1974 the plaintiff visited a doctor complaining
of an inflamed cyst on his eyelid.""' The doctor prescribed
Cleocin, warning the plaintiff that he might experience certain
side effects. 16 The plaintiff denied receiving this warning.16
6
Approximately five days after he started taking Cleocin, the
plaintiff began to feel nauseous and discontinued use of the
drug.167 Shortly thereafter, he developed severe diarrhea and
dehydration, probably due to the fact that during this period,
he was also taking an antiperistaltic agent." In January 1975
the plaintiff visited another doctor who diagnosed the plaintiff
as having pseudomembranous colitis (PMC), the condition
mentioned in Upjohn's 1974 warning.6 9 In addition to having
other operations, part of the plaintiffs colon had to be re-
moved. Even after surgery, the plaintiff still suffered from the




'' Id. at 851-53.
' Id. at 852.
'" Id. Among the side effects warned of in the 1974 warning were vomiting, nau-
sea, and diarrhea. The warning also recommended methods of relief. Furthermore,
the 1974 warning cautioned that the use of Cleocin in conjunction with antiperistaltic
agents (chemicals that induce intestinal contractions forcing the contents upward)
might prolong and/or worsen the condition. Id.
I Id.
167 Id.
I" Id. The plaintiff was taking Lomotil, an antiperistaltic agent effective in reliev-
ing diarrhea, which in plaintiff's case was caused by the use of Cleocin. The Lomotil,
however, merely worsened the plaintiff's condition, as was cautioned in the Upjohn
warning. Id.
Ie* ld.
Id. At the time this action was brought in 1980, the plaintiff was under dietary
restrictions, had diarrhea, could not engage in strenuous athletic activity, and tired
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The central issue at trial was the adequacy of the. 1974
warning, and both sides presented a great deal of evidence
concerning the warning."' As a part of his case, the plaintiff,
over Upjohn's objection, introduced evidence of a warning
published in March 1975 which significantly expanded upon
the 1974 warning.7 2 The court denied Upjohn's motion to ex-
clude all reference to the 1975 warning, 73 and the jury found
in favor of the plaintiff.17 4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that the rule against subsequent repairs is applicable
to strict liability actions. 7 The court reasoned that because
Rule 407 does not mention strict liability, the court should
examine the common law of the rule against admission of sub-
sequent repairs in negligence actions and determine if the pol-
icy reasons which caused the enactment of Rule 407 would be
subverted if such evidence were admitted to prove strict lia-
bility. M The Fourth Circuit found that in passing the federal
rule Congress intended the common law to fill the gaps and
omissions in the new rule.177 In examining the development of
Rule 407, the court was convinced that Congress intended
that evidence of subsequent repairs be excluded in cases in-
volving not only negligence, but also in cases where the defen-
dant is charged with culpable conduct.1 78 Strict liability, how-
ever, involves conduct which is less blameworthy than simple
negligence, because no breach of duty must be proven in a
strict liability case.' 79 From a policy standpoint, the court
opined, it follows that if the rule expressly excludes evidence
easily. Id.
171 Id.
171 Id. at 853.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 851.
17 Id. at 857.
176 Id.
'7 Id. at 856.
178 Id. at 857. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), "cul-
pable" means that an act is wrong, but not necessarily malicious.
171 All plaintiff need prove to make out a case in strict liability is a defective prod-
uct, control of the product by the defendant, and a link between the plaintiff's inju-
ries and the defect. See supra note 8.
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of subsequent repairs to prove culpable conduct, the same
should be true for strict liability.1 80
The court's second reason specifically addressed one of the
crucial issues in the Ault decision - the fundamental differ-
ence between negligence and strict liability.' The Werner
court, however, disagreed with the Ault court. In Werner, the
court conceded the obvious difference between the two types
of actions, 82 but determined that the difference should not
produce a different result. 83 The policy behind Rule 407 is to
encourage manufacturers to repair and upgrade products, a
policy which would be circumvented if evidence of such re-
pairs was admissible. 84 It is difficult to understand, the court
held, why this policy should apply differently to negligence
and strict liability actions. 8 To a defendant facing liability
for an alleged defect in a product, it makes no difference
under which theory the action is brought, for if the evidence is
admitted under either theory, the manufacturer will be de-
terred from making subsequent repairs.' 8 In reaching this
conclusion, the Werner court specifically rejected the ration-
ale of Ault, holding, as the majority of courts do, that evi-
dence of subsequent repairs is inadmissible in a strict liability
action. 8 7
Werner, 628 F.2d at 857. The court stated, however, that this is true only if
negligence and strict liability are not distinguishable on some other ground. The
court could find no such distinguishing factor. Id.
181 Id.
'.' Note, Subsequently Remedying, supra note 121, at 769. The advocates of ad-
mitting evidence of subsequent repairs argue that in negligence actions, the defen-
dant is on trial, while in strict liability, the focus is on the product. See supra note
121 and accompanying text.
181 Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
184 Id.
185 Id.
"I Id. The Second Circuit in Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2036 (1982), pointed out that, regardless of whether the
action is brought in negligence or strict liability, the defendant must pay the judg-
ment in both situations.
"I Werner, 628 F.2d at 857 (4th Cir. 1980). The court gave two additional reasons
why the Ault rationale should be rejected. First, it does not embrace a situation
where a manufacturer alters a product not because it is defective, but because it
could be made better or less expensively. By improving a nondefective product a
manufacturer could be opening himself up to unjustified liability. Second, if Ault
were to be followed in the federal courts, it might override Rule 407 since its reason-
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C. Analysis of the Arguments
1. The Ault Rationale
The California Supreme Court in Ault v. International
Harvester Co.'" held that evidence of subsequent repairs
should be admissible in products liability actions and based
its holding on two premises.' The first premise was that the
language of the statute spoke solely to negligence, not to strict
liability, because "culpable conduct" refers only to negligence,
not strict liability.' 90 As one commentator points out, how-
ever, this distinction is not as clear cut as the Ault court
would have one believe; a manufacturer can be seen as being
guilty of culpable conduct by merely placing a defective prod-
uct on the market.191 Under this line of reasoning, the attenu-
ated distinction between negligence and strict liability breaks
down further, especially when one considers that most plain-
tiffs who bring an action against a manufacturer do so on the
combined theories of negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability." 2To admit evidence under one theory would
require the evidence to be before the jury. Because the three
theories have similar elements, it is inevitable that the jury
will confuse the theories and the evidence, and thus the over-
all purpose of the rule against subsequent repairs would be
circumvented."'
The second premise relied upon by the Ault court was that
repairs would be encouraged by admitting the evidence, not
excluding it."e4 The court reasoned that a manufacturer would
repair a product if faced with liability under a products liabil-
ing that subsequent repair evidence is admissible in strict liability might apply with
equal force in negligence actions. Id. at 857-58. See supra notes 13-19 for a discussion
of the cases holding as Werner does.
1- 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
:89 Id. at 117-20, 528 P.2d at 1150-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-16 (1975).
Id. at 117-18, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L. J. 5, 15 (1965), cited in
Comment, supra note 24, at 214-15.
'9' Comment, supra note 24, at 225.
193 Id. at 226. See Eshbach v. W. T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1973) for
an example of the confusion presented when the two theories are pleaded together.
'" Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-21, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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ity theory where the plaintiff has a lighter burden of proof. ' 5
The court offers no proof, however, as to why the manufac-
turer would be more compelled to repair if faced with a prod-
ucts liability suit than if faced with a negligence suit, for lia-
bility under either action is enough to deter a manufacturer
from subsequently altering his product."" Furthermore, the
Ault court would admit evidence of subsequent change for
any reason, regardless of why a manufacturer changes his
product. 197 As Justice Clark pointed out in his dissent in Ault,
to impose liability on this basis would often penalize a manu-
facturer for making his product safer or more cost-efficient.19 8
In the dissenter's view, evidence of subsequent repair should
be admitted only when the plaintiff can satisfy the balancing
test advocated by Professor McCormick.' 99
Finally, the possibility of juror misuse of evidence of subse-
quent repairs is such a real threat as to make admission of
such evidence even under the recognized exceptions poten-
tially explosive.200 The similarities between certain elements
of a negligence action and a strict liability action are such that
the difference in the two theories is virtually indistinguishable
to a jury.2 0' To admit evidence of subsequent repairs in order
to prove a strict liability action, while warning the jury that
such evidence is not an admission of negligence, and to expect
the jury not to confuse the issue is to expect the impossible.2 '
Even with a proper limiting instruction, the chances that the
I9B Id.
'" Comment, supra note 24, at 223. See also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,
857 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (court determined that a de-
fendant will be deterred from repairing regardless of the theory under which relief is
sought).
Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 117, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
'" Id. at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820. Justice Clark points out the
absurdity of this proposition by pointing to the hundreds of changes made to new
models of automobiles every year. He queries as to whether the Ault majority would
interpret each of these modifications as an admission that the car was defective. Id.
'" Id. See infra note 222 and accompanying text for McCormick's test.
*0 Note, Products Liability, supra note 11, at 850; V. WALKOWIAK, supra note 32,
at 2-8.
4o Note, Products Liability, supra note 11, at 850. In both theories, for example,
plaintiff must show causation between his injury and the defendant's product or
instrumentality.
202 Id. at 850-51; see also Comment, supra note 24, at 215-16.
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jury will construe evidence of subsequent repairs as an admis-
sion of guilt are too great to justify the admission of the
evidence. 03
2. The Werner Rationale
The majority position, that evidence of subsequent repairs
is inadmissible, is not without its shortcomings. First, the rule
against admissibility deprives the trier of fact of evidence
which usually will affect the ultimate outcome of a case.' "
While such evidence has no bearing on antecedent negligence,
it is relevant in proving a defect in a product and that the
defendant had control of the defect.205 Furthermore, admit-
ting evidence of subsequent repairs may be the only way a
plaintiff can survive a motion for directed verdict, and accord-
ing to Professor McCormick, in that instance such evidence
should be admitted.20
6
Another reason why the Werner rationale should not be fol-
lowed is because to adhere strictly to Rule 407 in strict liabil-
ity actions would limit to a great extent the usefulness of the
theory of strict liability. The policy reason behind strict liabil-
ity is to encourage safer products by allocating loss to the de-
fendant manufacturer by easing the plaintiff's burden of
proof. To rigidly exclude all evidence of subsequent repairs in
strict liability actions would be to substantially repudiate that
policy, for without that evidence a plaintiff would have a
much more difficult time making out his cause of action, and
the purpose of strict liability would be defeated.20
203 Note, Products Liability, supra note 11, at 851. See also Bauman v. Volkswa-
genwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (failure of trial court to
give proper limiting instruction after admitting subsequent repair evidence is revers-
ible error).
"I Note, Post-Accident Repairs and Offers of Compromise-Shaping Exclusionary
Rules to Public Policy, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 487 (1979).
:06 See supra note 8.
06 MCCORMICK, supra note 5.
101 See, e.g., Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 879, 885 (1976), cited in
Note, Subsequently Remedying, supra note 121, at 787. ("[W]hile it may be sound to
exclude evidence of post injury remedial safety measures in negligence cases because
the repairs reflect hindsight rather than foresight and might militate against the mak-
ing of such repairs, to extend the rule to cases of strict products liability would, with-
out basis in reason, permit an arbitrary exclusionary rule to operate in the field of
consumer protection.").
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Finally, the policy behind the rule against subsequent re-
pairs, that of encouraging repairs, may no longer be material.
There may be more persuasive incentives to encourage re-
pairs, such as cost-efficiency, fear of adverse publicity, fear of
additional lawsuits, and political pressures from governmental
agencies. While the policy behind Rule 407 was laudable at
one point, today it may no longer be viable when applied to
strict products liability. Furthermore, it is unclear whether
the policy of encouraging repairs was ever a valid one, for no-
where has there been cited any empirical data that a single
repair was made because evidence of subsequent repairs was
excluded from a particular case. 09
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, the rule against subsequent
repairs, is a rule riddled with exceptions.210 It is a rule whose
supportive policy may or may not be valid. The once absolute
rule against admission of evidence of post-accident repairs is
now viewed by many as a rule of inclusion, rather than one of
exclusion.2 '
Should the rule be discarded in strict products liability ac-
tions, as many suggest? It is submitted that the rule should be
maintained for two reasons. First, the courts now recognize a
number of exceptions to the rule. The once absolute rule
against the admission of evidence of subsequent repairs is now
subject to the recognized exceptions concerning the defen-
dant's control or ownership of the accident-causing instru-
mentality,' the feasibility of a safer design of the instrumen-
tality, " and the impeachment of defendant's witnesses and
testimony. 1 These exceptions are broad enough in scope to
encompass much of what a plaintiff needs to prove to make
out a cause of action. Most evidence that is excluded under
208 Ault, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 120, 548 P.2d 1128, 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815-16 (1975).
208 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 6.
210 See supra notes 71-113 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
2i2 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
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the general rule against subsequent repairs can be admitted
under one of the exceptions. Furthermore, there is no reason
to admit all evidence of subsequent repairs, because in com-
bined strict liability/negligence actions the possibility that the
jury will misconstrue the evidence is all too apparent.21 Only
that evidence which gives defendant an unfair advantage by
giving him a direct benefit over and above the fact of exclu-
sion should be admitted, and in these situations the excep-
tions to Rule 407 override the general rule.2 e If evidence of
subsequent repairs is admitted under this procedure, the
chances of juror misuse greatly diminish, and both plaintiff
and defendant are protected.21 Additionally, with the advent
of alternative pleading,2 18 a plaintiff is presented with a vari-
ety of ways of admitting his evidence. 1 9 If, as the Ault court
held, the premise of strict liability is to enable the plaintiff to
more easily make out a cause of action by easing his burden of
proof,220 abolishing the rule against subsequent repairs is not
the only way to accomplish this end. Indeed, alternative
pleading and admission under the exceptions to Rule 407,
while maintaining the general rule, is a better answer, for it
prevents juror misuse of sometimes complex evidence. In light
of the foregoing discussion, there is simply no reason to abol-
215 See, e.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2036 (1982); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
"' Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981).
017 See Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975) (Clark, J., dissenting) for a discussion of a balancing test which if adopted
would achieve this goal.
S6 Alternative pleading is permitted under FKD. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2), which provides
in relevant part: "A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically ......
219 Comment, supra note 24, at 225. The author suggests six different ways a plain-
tiff can get evidence of defect and causation admitted in products liability actions
without emasculating the rule. Those ways are: 1) introduce evidence of defect itself;
2) introduce evidence regarding events leading up to the accident; 3) introduce evi-
dence of the history of the life of the product; 4) introduce evidence of similar prod-
ucts and uses; 5) eliminate alternative causes of accident; 6) use circumstantial evi-
dence. Id. at 228.
*2o Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 814 (1975).
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ish the rule on the ground that Rule 407 would exclude abso-
lutely all evidence of subsequent repairs.
Secondly, a better alternative is available. Instead of ex-
cluding the evidence completely, or letting all evidence in, it is
submitted that by employing a balancing test such as the one
suggested by Professor McCormick," the best of both views
can be accommodated. Professor McCormick would admit evi-
dence of subsequent repairs only if the following test were
met: "1) the evidence must be of substantial importance and
actually, not merely formally in dispute; 2) the plaintiff can-
not establish the fact to be inferred conveniently by other
proof; and 3) in the opinion of the court, the need for the evi-
dence outweighs the danger of its misuse. ' 222 This is the bal-
ancing test, or "three part test" that Justice Clark advocated
in his dissent in Ault v. International Harvester Co. 223 In
Clark's opinion, this test must be used in both negligence and
strict liability actions, for "the danger of misuse [is] not cured
when the issue before the jury is defect rather than negli-
gence . . 224 By using this balancing test, defendants would
still enjoy the protection of Rule 407, except in the extreme
case where a plaintiff could satisfy all three elements of the
McCormick test. Prejudicial evidence could be excluded by
the trial judge if it were thought capable of confusing or in-
flaming the jury, while at the same time defendants would be
free to later repair products, for whatever reason, knowing
that the evidence will not be used as an admission of guilt.
Thus the policy reasons behind Rule 407 would be preserved.
On the other side, the plaintiff would still enjoy the use of
subsequent repair evidence when the evidence was deemed by
the trial court either to come within one of the exceptions, or
to satisfy the balancing test. In this way the plaintiff has a
better chance of admitting his evidence. Thus, it is submitted
that both plaintiff and defendant would not only be in a posi-
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5.
"' Id.




tion where both interests are more favorably protected, but
also where each can dependably rely on a consistent interpre-
tation of Rule 407, the rule against subsequent repairs.

